亚投行不提了 美国须检讨 亚投行教训

美国须检讨 亚投行教训  

This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system. True
there have been any number of periods of frustration for the US before
and times when American behaviour was hardly multilateralist
such as the 1971 Nixon shock
ending the convertibility of the dollar into gold. But I can think of no event since Bretton Woods parable to the bination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution and the failure of the US to persuade dozens of its traditional allies
starting with Britain
to stay out of it.
This failure of strategy and tactics was a long time ing
and it should lead to a prehensive review of the US approach to global economics. With China’s economic size rivalling America’s and emerging markets accounting for at least half of world output
the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment. Political pressures from all sides in the US have rendered it increasingly dysfunctional.
Largely because of resistance from the right
the US stands alone in the world in failing to approve the International Moary Fund governance reforms that Washington itself pushed for in 2009. By supplementing IMF resources
this change would have bolstered confidence in the global economy. More important
it would e closer to giving countries such as China and India a share of IMF votes mensurate with their new economic heft.
美国政府在2009年推动国际货币基金组织(IMF)进行治理改革，但主要由于右翼的阻挠，美国未能批准改革方案，令其在国际社会陷入孤立。该改革方案本可以通过补充IMF的资源，提振全球经济信心。更重要的是，它可以赋予中国和印度等国与其新的经济份量更加相称的投票权份额。
Meanwhile
pressures from the left have led to pervasive restrictions on infrastructure projects financed through existing development banks
which consequently have receded as funders
even as many developing countries now see infrastructure finance as their principal external funding need.
With US mitments unhonoured and US-backed policies blocking the kinds of finance other countries want to provide or receive through the existing institutions
the way was clear for China to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. There is room for argument about the tactical approach that should have been taken once the initiative was put forward. But the larger question now is one of strategy. Here are three precepts that US leaders should keep in mind.
First
American leadership must have a bipartisan foundation at home
be free from gross hypocrisy and be restrained in the pursuit of self-interest. As long as one of our major parties is opposed to essentially all trade agreements
and the other is resistant to funding international anisations
the US will not be in a position to shape the global economic system.
Other countries are legitimately frustrated when US officials ask them to adjust their policies — then insist that American state regulators
independent agencies and far-reaching judicial actions are beyond their control. This is especially true when many foreign businesses assert that US actions raise real rule of law problems.
The legitimacy of US leadership depends on our resisting the temptation to abuse it in pursuit of parochial interest
even when that interest appears pelling. We cannot expect to maintain the dollar’s primary role in the international system if we are too aggressive about limiting its use in pursuit of particular security objectives.
Second
in global as well as domestic politics
the middle class counts the most. It sometimes seems that the prevailing global agenda bines elite concerns about matters such as intellectual property
investment protection and regulatory harmonisation with moral concerns about global poverty and posterity
while offering little to those in the middle. Approaches that do not serve the working class in industrial countries (and rising urban populations in developing ones) are unlikely to work out well in the long run.
Third
we may be headed into a world where capital is abundant and deflationary pressures are substantial. Demand could be in short supply for some time. In no big industrialised country do markets expect real interest rates to be much above zero in 2020 or inflation targets to be achieved. In the future
the priority must be promoting investment
not imposing austerity. The present system places the onus of adjustment on “borrowing” countries. The world now requires a symmetric system
with pressure also placed on “surplus” countries.
These precepts are just a beginning
and many questions remain. There are questions about global public goods
about acting with the speed and clarity that the current era requires
about co-operation beeen governmental and non-governmental actors
and much more. What is crucial is that the events of the past month will be seen by future historians not as the end of an era
but as a salutary wake up call.
The writer is Charles W Eliot University professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary