中国与美国——奇特的一对儿

2009.10.22
摘自《经济学家》（《The Economists》）　　

作为西方主流的政治经济类右翼媒体，《经济学家》代表了相当一部分利益集团的声音，倾听这个声音是必要的。可以发现他们在主张什么，甚或说，他们希望别人以为他们在主张什么。　　

本期的《经济学家》是中美特辑，译者从中选择了一篇有代表性的文章。　　

除了一贯的妖魔化中国、粗暴地干涉我国内政、对人权问题的横加指责，这篇文章还表达了怎样的信息呢？　　

由于水平所限，不做评论。在此只是翻译了这篇文章，供有识之士分析考察。　　

中国和美国——奇特的一对儿　　

美国应该更加自信地与中国这一最强劲对手打交道　　

在与中国打交道时，西方人总是在他们的话里掺入些中国古典文化的智慧，这已经成了一项繁琐的传统。巴拉克·奥巴马在七月份对中美领导人的讲话中，不仅引用了儒家圣人孟子的平庸语录，而且还有一句他们的篮球运动员姚明说得更令人昏昏欲睡的话：“不管你是新队员还是老队员，你都需要时间来适应其他队友。”尽管现在距离中美恢复被共产党掌权割断的外交关系已经三十年了，但是双方的确仍然需要互相适应。　　

问题的关键在于，对两国来说，未来关系走向都有着深深的不确定性。在很多方面，两国在同一条船上。他们的经济互相交错，尤其是在过去的十年中。美国是世界上最大的债务国，而中国是最大的债权国。从气候变化到经济复苏，世界面临着很多问题，需要中美齐心协力去应对。　　

普鲁士蓝 中国红　　

困扰着两国关系的是对冷战甚至战争爆发的恐惧。华盛顿特区的一些人将中国称为“新的普鲁士”。　　

中国进行了迅速的军事扩张，这可能会威胁到美国作为亚洲和平维护者和台湾主权保护者的地位。中国正在悄悄地建造第一艘航空母舰，但其将领甚至不愿意和他们的美国同行谈一下这件事情。　　

战略竞争的背后是中国经济的崛起。它的公司在向非洲和拉美殖民，并讨好那些西方避之不及的政权。它的巨大外汇储备和对于占便宜灵敏嗅觉，意味着在未来几年里，中国在西方的投资会大幅增长。更糟的是，中国持有价值八千亿美元（？）的美国政府债券，这赋予了中国足以决定美国经济生死的力量。　　

局势在未来几年内会变得更加紧张。首先不可避免的是，2012年会发生重要的政治转变：台湾大选、美国大选，以及中国共产党的代表大会。其次，人们普遍认为世界的权力结构发生了调整，对于美国和中国组成的G2，有人认为这代表了美中的国际话语权几乎趋于相等。实际上，正如我们的特别报道指出的那样，这是一种很危险的误解。按市场汇率换算，中国的经济总量仍只是美国的三分之一。中国的人均GDP知识美国的十四分之一。两国的创新能力还有很大差距。美国的国防预算仍是中国的四倍。中国不能抛售美国的政府债券，因为美元的暴跌会伤害到它自己的经济。　　

由于美国的消费减少了，中国采取了刺激内需的措施，巨大而且在政治上带来很多麻烦的贸易顺差减小了。同时，中国过度加强经济对外扩张的危险是加剧贸易保护主义，况且此时美国的失业率正处在很痛苦的高位，容易采取贸易保护主义措施。在地缘政治权利方面，中国既不想，也没有能力挑战美国。尽管中国领导人以自信的形象在世界的舞台上示人，他们仍然在全力消解国内的不满：在中国每年都有数以万计的抗议活动。　　

中国所有的这些经济发展，和各种紧张局势——社会的、文化的、人口的、甚至宗教的问题，伴随着这个政权，这可以解释为什么它总是如此频繁地诉诸民族主义。所以美国当前由于自身的不安全感而采取的对华政策是很奇怪的，并且错误的。　　

简单来说，危险在于一个害怕了的美国会在经济上对中国太苛刻，而在人权方面则不够严厉。在货币问题上，奥巴马先生提高中国轮胎关税的愚蠢决定给予了美国的贸易保护主义以鼓励。由于失业率正在无情地升至10%， 国会面临的要求对中国出口货物和被低估的人民币值进行自卫反击的压力会加大。这是很不好的经济局面，中美双方都会在这场贸易战中损失惨重。　　

如果经济自由是奥巴马下个月中国之行中不应牺牲掉的美国价值，那么另外的个人自由也不应该被牺牲掉。与中国的专制主义打交道并不比从前更简单，因为中国是一股正在崛起的力量，除了作为一时的权宜之计，人权的筹码也不那么好用了。　　

虽然奥巴马先生需要中国来帮助修复世界经济和应对气候危机，但这并不意味这自由世界的领袖应该停止对其政治体制的批评。美国并不需要在本月拒绝在华盛顿会见达赖喇嘛用以贿赂中国。因为热切地想加强其在国内形象的中国共产党像奥巴马先生一样渴望一次成功的会谈。　　

同床异梦——一强一弱

一种更自信的方法就是把赌注压在看哪种政府机制能够提供最终的强盛。　　

目前中国关于气候、金融危机以及甲流瘟疫的表态赢得了国际赞扬。但是他们同时也付出了专制系统的独有的代价。例如在温室效应方面，如果中国明确地用行动改善了国内的民主状况，它本可以更慢地行动，因为大家都知道中国的体制允许中国进行大规模的动员以及做一些政治上非常困难的决定。不过要在长期有效的应对气候变化，需要公众对这个问题的真正了解以及一个能使有绿色技术的外国公司进入中国而不不担心知识产权的问题的法律环境，而两者都是中国欠缺的。　　

在中国强大的外表下，在它北京十月一日那惊人的导弹和坦克的游行之下，是浮躁和脆弱——就在国庆当天，由于害怕抗议者，政府禁止人们观看游行。　　

尽管中国越来越富裕，但社会矛盾似乎更加尖锐了。中国的惯用做法——封杀活动家，并不是长久之计。奥巴马先生应该在北京找到抗议者。如果中国因此发了点脾气，那就让他们发去吧。　

　China　 and 　　America　　　　

The odd couple　　

Oct 22nd 2009
From The Economist print edition　　

　　America　　 should be much more confident in its dealings with its closest rival　　

Illustration by Jon Berkeley　 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

IT HAS become a tedious tradition for Westerners dealing with 　　China　　 to garnish their speeches with wisdom from the Chinese classics. Barack Obama, addressing Chinese and American leaders in July, used not just a banal quotation from Mencius, a Confucian sage, but a punchier one from Yao Ming, a Chinese basketball player: “No matter whether you are new or an old team member, you need time to adjust to one another.” Though it is 30 years since the two countries re-established diplomatic ties severed by the Communist takeover, both sides still badly need to adjust. 　　

The heart of the problem is a profound uncertainty in both countries about where the relationship may lead. In many respects the two countries are in the same bed. Their economies have become interlocked, especially in the past decade. 　America　 is the world’s biggest debtor and 　　China　　 its biggest creditor. From climate change to the economic recovery, the world faces problems that demand 　China　 and 　　America　　 work in concert.　　

Prussian blues, Chinese reds　　

Yet relations are dogged by fears of a new cold war, or even a hot one, breaking out. Some Americans in 　Washington　, 　DC　, talk of 　China　 as “the new 　　Prussia　　”. 　China　 has engaged in a rapid military build-up that could challenge 　America　 as the defender of Asian peace (and 　　Taiwan　　’s sovereignty). 　　Unannounced　, 　China　　 is building its first aircraft-carrier, yet its generals often refuse even to talk to their American peers.　　

Underlying the strategic competition is 　　China　　’s economic rise. Its companies are “colonising” swathes of Africa and 　Latin America　, cosying up to regimes Westerners shun. Its huge foreign-exchange holdings and its sniffing of bargains mean Chinese investment in the West will grow rapidly in the coming years. And to cap it all, 　　China　　 owns $800 billion of American government debt—enough to give it power of life and death over the American economy.　　

Tensions will get worse in the next few years for two reasons. The first is unavoidable: 2012 witnesses important political transitions in the form of elections in 　Taiwan　 and 　America　 and a Communist Party Congress in 　　China　　. Second—and more generally—there has been a recalibration of perceived power. There is now talk of a G2 of China and 　　America　　, implying that their global weights are nearly equal. In fact, as our special report argues, this is a misperception, and a dangerous one. 　　

　China　’s economy is still less than a third the size of 　　America　　’s at market exchange-rates. Its GDP per head is one-fourteenth that of 　　America　　. The innovation gap between the two countries remains huge. 　America　’s defence budget is still six times 　　China　　’s. As for the Treasury bills, dumping them is not an option for 　　China　　: a tumbling dollar would hurt its own economy (see article). And as American consumers spend less, while Chinese stimulus boosts its domestic spending, the huge and politically troublesome trade imbalances are shrinking. In the meantime, the danger of overegging 　　China　　’s economic expansion abroad is that it will fuel protectionism at a time when American unemployment is painfully high. 　　

In terms of geopolitical power, 　China　 has neither the clout nor the inclination to challenge 　　America　　. Confidently though 　　China　　’s leaders now strut the world stage, they remain preoccupied by simmering discontent at home: there are tens of thousands of protests each year. For all the economic progress, all sorts of tensions—social, cultural, demographic, even religious—haunt the regime and help explain why it resorts to nationalism so often. So it is odd, and wrong, that 　America　’s approach towards 　　China　　 is driven by its own insecurities.　　

To simplify enormously, the danger is that a frightened 　United States　 will be too tough on 　　China　　 over the economy, especially trade; and not tough enough on human rights. On money matters, Mr Obama’s foolish decision to slap tariffs on Chinese tyres has given dangerous encouragement to protectionists in 　　America　　. As unemployment there climbs inexorably towards 10%, the pressure will grow for Congress to fuel a self-defeating attack on Chinese exports and the undervalued yuan. This is bad economics: both 　China　 and 　　America　　 would lose enormously from a trade war.　　

If economic freedom is one American value that Mr Obama should not sacrifice on his first visit to 　　China　　 next month, the other is personal freedom. Chinese authoritarianism is not somehow more acceptable because 　　China　　 is a rising power; nor are human rights bargaining chips to be played only when expedient. That Mr Obama needs Chinese help to fix the global economy and on climate-change mitigation does not mean the leader of the free world should stifle criticism of its political system. Avoiding a meeting with the Dalai Lama in 　　Washington　　 this month was an unnecessary sop to his hosts. The Communist Party, keen to bolster its image at home, wants the trip to appear successful as much as Mr Obama does. 　　

Same bed, different dreams—and one is stronger　　

A more confident approach is a bet on whose sort of system of government will prove ultimately stronger. At the moment 　　China　　’s responses on the climate, the financial crisis and the emerging swine-flu pandemic have won it praise internationally. But they have also borne the hallmarks of an authoritarian system. For instance, on greenery, it is clear that if 　China　 had exposed its response to the rigours of democratic debate, it would have acted more slowly: 　　China　　’s system enables it to mobilise huge resources and make politically difficult decisions. But an effective long-term response to climate change needs public understanding of the issues and a legal environment that allows foreign owners of green technologies to transfer them without fear of theft. 　　China　　 lacks both. 　　

Behind 　China　’s façade of strength, on stunning display with its parade of tanks and missiles through 　　Beijing　　 on October 1st, lie fretful frailties—also on display that day, when spectators were banned for fear of protests. Social tensions in 　　China　　 are likely to rise, even as it grows richer. Locking up activists, as 　　China　　 has been wont to do recently, is not a lasting solution. Mr Obama should meet some of them in 　　Beijing　　 to find out for himself. If his hosts have a hissy fit, let them.